

Challenging The United States Symmetrically And Asymmetrically Can America Be Defeated

"The Oxford Handbook of US National Security frames the context, institutions, and processes the US government uses to advance national interests through foreign policy, government institutions, and grand strategy. Contributors examine contemporary national security challenges and the processes and tools used to improve national security."--Provided by publisher. It is still easy to underestimate how much the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War?--and then the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001?--transformed the task of American foreign and defense policymaking. In place of predictability (if a sometimes terrifying predictability), the world is now very unpredictable. In place of a single overriding threat and benchmark by which all else could be measured, a number of possible threats have arisen, not all of them states. In place of force-on-force engagements, U.S. defense planners have to assume "asymmetric" threats?--ways not to defeat U.S. power but to render it irrelevant. This book frames the challenges for defense policy that the transformed world engenders, and it sketches new tools for dealing with those challenges?--from new techniques in modeling and gaming, to planning based on capabilities rather than threats, to personnel planning and making use of "best practices" from the private sector.

Existing models of state formation are derived primarily from early Western European experience, and are misleading when applied to nation-states struggling to consolidate their dominion in the present period. In this volume, scholars suggest that the Western European model of armies waging war on behalf of sovereign states does not hold universally. The importance of 'irregular' armed forces - militias, guerrillas, paramilitaries, mercenaries, bandits, vigilantes, police, and so on - has been seriously neglected in the literature on this subject. The case studies in this book suggest, among other things, that the creation of the nation-state as a secure political entity rests as much on 'irregular' as regular armed forces. For most of the 'developing' world, the state's legitimacy has been difficult to achieve, constantly eroding or challenged by irregular armed forces within a country's borders. No account of modern state formation can be considered complete without attending to irregular forces.

*The concept of asymmetrical warfare is a popular and much discussed issue in U.S. defense literature these days. Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) are just a few of the documents that express concern about it. Understandably, the Secretary of Defense has made addressing the phenomenon a central theme of his administration. All of that said, what exactly is meant by asymmetrical warfare? In broad terms it simply means warfare that seeks to avoid an opponent's strengths; it is an approach that tries to focus whatever may be one side's comparative advantages against its enemy's relative weaknesses. In a way, seeking asymmetries is fundamental to all warfighting. But in the modern context, asymmetrical warfare emphasizes what are popularly perceived as unconventional or nontraditional methodologies. For most potential adversaries, attacking the United States asymmetrically is the only warfighting strategy they might reasonably consider for the foreseeable future. The Gulf War was an object lesson to military planners around the globe of the futility of attempting to confront the United States symmetrically, that is, with like forces and orthodox tactics. The U.S. Army War College's Ninth Annual Strategy Conference was held at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The theme of the conference was "Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?" There were some 150 attendees, including active duty military personnel as well as members of academe, the U.S. Defense and service departments, think tanks, corporations, and news media. This book is an outgrowth of that conference, though it makes no effort to present a comprehensive and literal record of events in the mold of traditional colloquium "proceedings." Rather, the book is organized as an anthology of selected conference presentations, complemented by sufficient notice of roundtable and question-and-answer discussion to provide a glimpse of the vigorous interplay of ideas evoked by this most timely of topics. Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and the Western Mindset * Part I: Symmetries & Asymmetries - A Historical Perspective * Technology & Asymmetries in Modern Warfare * The Myth of Blitzkrieg * Asymmetric Response to American Air Supremacy in Vietnam * Part II: Threats * Introduction * Takedown: Targets, Tools, & Technocracy * Information Peacekeeping: The Purest Form of War * Terrorism & Asymmetry * Metaphors & Modern Threats: Biological, Computer, and Cognitive Viruses * Our New Old Enemies * Part III: State-On-State Approaches * Introduction * How We Will Lose the War with Russia: A Critique of U.S. Military Strategy * Regional State Competitors: The Case of Iraq * Beyond Russia and China: A Survey of Threats to U.S. Security From Lesser States * Part IV: Roundtable on Future Responses-Robert H. Scales, Jr., Timothy A. Kinnan, and John Allen Williams*

This brand new edition of The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century re-examines the challenges faced by the military profession in the aftermath of the international terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. While many of the issues facing the military profession examined in the first edition remain, the 'new war' and international terrorism have compounded the challenges. The US military must respond to the changed domestic and strategic landscapes without diminishing its primary function—a function that now many see that goes beyond success on the battlefield. Not only has this complicated the problem of reconciling the military professional ethos and raison d'être with civilian control in a democracy, it challenges traditional military professionalism. This book also studies the notion of a US military stretched thin and relying more heavily on the US Federal Reserves and National Guard. These developments make the US military profession increasingly linked to public attitudes and political perspectives. In sum, the challenge faced by the US military profession can be termed a dual dilemma. It must respond effectively to the twenty-first century strategic landscape while undergoing the revolution in military affairs and transformation. At the same time, the military profession must insure that it remains compatible with civilian cultures and the US political-social system without eroding its primary function. This is an invaluable book for all students with an interest in the US Military, and of strategic studies and military history in general.

Great Power Strategy in Asia, 1905-2005 analyzes the enduring themes underlying the strategic struggles in East Asia, beginning with the crucial event of the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War. Jonathan Bailey clearly shows why military history is highly relevant in understanding today's strategic problems, and how the most important areas of current affairs have their roots in often forgotten corners of military history. He makes his powerful case in three clear sections: an analysis of the explosive factors that led to war between Russia and Japan in 1904, presenting a ten-year perspective of the War, focusing on its consequences: cultural shock in 'the West', re-alignment of Asian imperial geography and the failure to learn vital military lessons, as World

War I approached a thirty-five year perspective of the war, showing why Japan repeated the essential strategic, operational and tactical ploys of its war against Russia in 1904 in its strike upon the USA in 1941. Allied victory assured the downfall of Europe's empires in Asia, with the USA inheriting much of the old imperial legacy a centennial view of the Russo-Japanese War, which demonstrates that many of the broader issues identifiable in 1904-05 remain at the heart of today's strategic discourse: Western apprehension about the economic rise of Japan; the anomalies of an 'American Empire'; tensions between Occident and Orient; the apparent new relevance of geopolitics; and the importance of demography in perceptions of global power. This book is multidisciplinary, emphasizing the linkages between imperial power-politics, military operations, cultural conflict and commercial rivalry. It is also the story of military innovation, the pathology of learning lessons from the experience of war, and the anticipated rise of Asian, or more specifically Chinese, power a century after the false dawn of the Japanese victory in 1905. This book will be of great interest to all students of the Russo-Japanese War, Asian security, and of military and strategic studies.

[America's Defense of the New World Order](#)

[QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security](#)

[Air mobility the key to the United States national security strategy](#)

[The US Military Profession into the 21st Century](#)

[The Sheriff](#)

[Threat and Response in the 21st Century](#)

[NATO After Enlargement](#)

[Globalization and Political Ethics](#)

[Legitimate Target](#)

[Strategy for Chaos](#)

[A Criteria-Based Approach to Targeted Killing](#)

In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy 'works'. The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court. The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.

Rapid progress in information and communications technologies is dramatically enhancing the strategic role of information, positioning effective exploitation of these technology advances as a critical success factor in military affairs. These technology advances are drivers and enablers for the "nervous system" of the military—its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems—to more effectively use the "muscle" side of the military. Authored by a committee of experts drawn equally from the military and commercial sectors, *Realizing the Potential of C4I* identifies three major areas as fundamental challenges to the full Department of Defense (DOD) exploitation of C4I technology—information systems security, interoperability, and various aspects of DOD process and culture. The book details principles by which to assess DOD efforts in these areas over the long term and provides specific, more immediately actionable recommendations. Although DOD is the focus of this book, the principles and issues presented are also relevant to interoperability, architecture, and security challenges faced by government as a whole and by large, complex public and private enterprises across the economy.

This book examines the dynamics of terrorist financing, including a discussion about the importance of money from both the terrorist and the counter-terrorist perspective. *Targeting Terrorist Financing* argues that it is not the institutions that have failed the war on terrorist financing; rather it is the states that have failed the institutions. The measures contemplated by the world community to interdict terrorists and their financial infrastructures are sufficient to debilitate the terrorists both militarily and financially. However, what has been increasingly lacking is political will among the states, and this has overwhelmed the spirit of cooperation in this very critical front against terrorism. This volume assesses the need for international cooperation and the role of institutions and regimes in targeting terrorist financing. After the 9/11 attacks, there was an expression of global willingness to target terrorism generally, and terrorist financing in particular. The institutional mechanisms that grew out of this are explored in detail here, with a critical examination of the progress made by the international community. The impact of these measures is considered with respect to changes in the nature of the terrorist threat, money confiscated, adoption of international conventions, and global standards by states, and levels of compliance, among others. This book will be of great interest to students of terrorism, international organisations, international security, and IR in general. Arabinda Acharya is Research Fellow, Manager of Strategic Projects and Head of the Terrorist Financing Response Project at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

The U.S. Army War College's Ninth Annual Strategy Conference was held at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, during the period March 31-April 2, 1998. The theme of the conference was "Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?" There were some 150 attendees, including active duty military

personnel as well as members of academe, the U.S. Defense and service departments, think tanks, corporations, and news media. This book is an outgrowth of that conference, though it makes no effort to present a comprehensive and literal record of events in the mold of traditional colloquium "proceedings." Rather, the book is organized as an anthology of selected conference presentations, complemented by sufficient notice of roundtable and question-and-answer discussion to provide a glimpse of the vigorous interplay of ideas evoked by this most timely of topics.

The concept of asymmetrical warfare is a popular and much discussed issue in U.S. defense literature these days. Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010),² the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),³ and the National Military Strategy (NMS)⁴ are just a few of the documents that express concern about it. Understandably, the Secretary of Defense has made addressing the phenomenon a central theme of his administration. All of that said, what exactly is meant by asymmetrical warfare? In broad terms it simply means warfare that seeks to avoid an opponent's strengths; it is an approach that tries to focus whatever may be one side's comparative advantages against its enemy's relative weaknesses.⁵ In a way, seeking asymmetries is fundamental to all warfighting. But in the modern context, asymmetrical warfare emphasizes what are popularly perceived as unconventional or nontraditional methodologies. For most potential adversaries, attacking the United States asymmetrically is the only warfighting strategy they might reasonably consider for the foreseeable future. The Gulf War was an object lesson to military planners around the globe of the futility of attempting to confront the United States symmetrically, that is, with like forces and orthodox tactics. In this essay I briefly examine how the West's cultural disposition and mindset affect its concept of asymmetrical warfare. I contend that the West's current focus may leave it vulnerable to asymmetrical challenges that arise from opponents whose cultural perspective differs significantly from that of the West. The author offers a scenario which frontally assaults some of the premises he sees emerging from the Army After Next Project. He forecasts a scenario in which a future enemy concedes that the U.S. Army's superior technology, advanced weaponry, and proven record of success in recent military operations make it virtually invulnerable to conventional forms of symmetric attack. They therefore seek asymmetric ways to obviate those advantages. The author devises a five-dimensional, holistic approach to warfare that uses the three dimensions of land, sea, and aerospace but also incorporates the temporal and cyber dimensions of warfare. This approach to warfare exploits U.S. weaknesses while maximizing the enemy's limited areas of technological capability.

[Military Review](#)

[Applied Language Learning](#)

[Targeting Terrorist Financing](#)

[War, Peace and Politics](#)

[The Future of the American Military Presence in Europe](#)

[The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security](#)

[Essays on Power in a Time of Dominance](#)

[Military Competitiveness in the Age of Transparency](#)

[Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History](#)

[Can America be Defeated? Technology and the Myth of Blitzkrieg, Terrorism and Air Supremacy in Vietnam, Losing War with Russia](#)

[Landpower and Dual Containment: Rethinking America's Policy in the Gulf](#)

This thoroughly updated edition with expanded coverage explores the impact of terrorism on economics, public health, religion and pop culture, and also includes details of ethical issues and debates relating to terrorism.

The author of this study contends that America's Dual Containment policy has failed. He outlines in what way he thinks that it has, and suggests alternative policies, which he believes might prove successful, and which would not destabilize the Gulf-the risk that (in the author's view) we are now running. By a combination of economic sanctions and more forcible methods, America has sought, through Dual Containment, to make Iran and Iraq amend behavior that the United States believes it cannot tolerate. In the case of Iraq, America finds actions of the leadership so abhorrent that nothing less than a complete regime change is demanded. The United States wants Iran to give up its alleged support for terrorism.

Summary of the proceedings of the US Army War College Tenth Annual Strategy Conference.

In April 1999, NATO members will celebrate in Washington the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty and the founding of NATO. At that time they will enroll three new members: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, decide upon NATO's new strategic concept, and raise issues connected with the possibility of further enlargement. In the wake of the Paris and Madrid conferences of 1997 that consummated agreements with Russia and Ukraine on their relationships with NATO and resolved to admit the three aforementioned states as members, NATO is moving forward to reshape the European security agenda. But, as in other situations, we may ask "Quo Vadis NATO?" and even more sharply make the same inquiry of individual members and of Russia. In fact, it is quite clear that, despite the American claim that enlargement is merely projecting stability eastward, it actually constitutes a radical transformation of the European agenda and of both U.S. and European history. And, as such, NATO enlargement raises a host of issues for future consideration. But nobody can say for sure where enlargement will lead, or, more importantly, how it will be enforced, though hopes for and prognostications of the ultimate point of arrival abound. Nor can we resolve with any certainty the myriad issues involved in extending NATO both in terms of its organizational scope and its future missions. That extension, particularly in terms of territory or geographical scope is immense in its implications, but the final outcome or resolution of all those issues necessarily remains unclear. That uncertainty is not surprising. It is commonly the case that major restructurings of international politics are undertaken by statesmen and politicians who have only a partial notion at best of where they hope

go. As Napoleon would have said, .on s'engage et puis on voit,. (One commits himself and then sees where he is). Precisely because the process of NATO enlargement is itself such a transformation and raises probably more issues and questions than it answers, the Strategic Studies Institute undertook a conference in Washington on January 26, 1998, to begin the process of seeing where the United States and where NATO are going. The following chapters are the fruits of that conference, but obviously they can only deal with some of the issues. Questions like the Baltic littoral's future, the nature of peace operations in the future, or the emerging situation in Bosnia and, more recently, in Kosovo, are not specifically included. But many other fundamental issues have been addressed. Simon Serfaty addresses the larger issue of where European security institutions in general, i.e., not just NATO, but the European Union and its hoped-for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are going. Robert Dorff assesses trends in both American and European public opinion regarding issues raised by enlargement and possible future military contingencies. Stephen Blank probes the rival visions of America, Russia, and Europe concerning the future missions and roles of NATO and of these three sets of governments. Sherman Garnett and Rachel Levenson analyze the complicated situation on Russia's Western frontier where Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine all interact in a complex way with Russia and the members of NATO. Rachel Bronson and Glen Howard track the little-discussed but increasingly important strategic interaction of NATO and the United States with the Transcaucasian and Central Asia states. General Edward Atkeson (U.S. Army Retired) discusses issues of burdensharing among allies and the military implications of the Partnership for Peace program within the expanded NATO. And General Frederick Kroesen (U.S. Army Retired) raises the important question of how NATO actually should go about building a true military coalition.

While terrorists can be ultra-rational they are as likely to flail out without much thought and predicting their behaviour is difficult. This book explores the use of advanced technology by terrorists and finds that opportunism is the most likely reason for their choice of any particular mode of attack.

President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive-39 (PDD 39) in June 1995 establishing the U.S. Policy on Counter-Terrorism that identified for the first time the use of biological weapons as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorist. This study will discuss anthrax as a Weapon of Mass Destruction in the historical context of biological weapons. It evaluates the mandatory Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP), discusses the disease manifestations of Anthrax, describes Crisis Management and Consequence Management Operations, and reviews the Federal and State Response Plans to WMD. It concludes with recommendations on how the United States can mitigate the effects of anthrax as a Weapon of Mass Destruction.

[Realizing the Potential of C4I](#)

[The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Second Edition](#)

[U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy](#)

[Professional Journal of the United States Army](#)

[International Cooperation and New Regimes](#)

[Can America Be Defeated?](#)

[Monthly Catalog of United States Government Publications](#)

[Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals](#)

[Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training](#)

[Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?](#)

[Anthrax](#)

In recent years, the nature of conflict has changed. Through asymmetric warfare radical groups and weak state actors are using unexpected means to deal stunning blows to more powerful opponents. To information warfare, the West's air power, sea power and land power are open to attack from clever, but much weaker, enemies. In this clear and engaging introduction, Rod Thornton unpacks asymmetric warfare, in both civilian and military realms, and examines why it has become such an important subject for study. He seeks to provide answers to key questions, such as how weaker states can defend against the West's military superiority, and shows how the West's military superiority can be seriously undermined by asymmetric threats. The book concludes by looking at the ways in which the West's asymmetric attack, is attempting to cope with some new battlefield realities. This is an indispensable guide to one of the key topics in security studies today.

Kori Schake examines key questions about the United States' position of power in the world, including, Why is the United States' power so threatening? Is it sustainable? Does military force still matter? What are the current practices to reduce the U.S. cost of managing the system? What accounts for the United States' stunning success in the round of globalization that swept across the international order? The author also offers suggestions on what issues the next president should focus to build an even stronger foundation of U.S. power.

Keeping ahead of terrorists requires innovative, up-to-date training. This follow-up to Stephen Sloan's pioneering 1981 book, *Simulating Terrorism*, takes stock of twenty-first-century terrorism—and how to counter it. Quickly canvassing the evolution of terrorism—and of counterterrorism efforts—over the past thirty years, co-authors Sloan and Robert J. Bunker draw on examples from the early 2000s, the 9/11 Center and Pentagon attacks, to emphasize the need to prevent or respond quickly to "active aggressors"—terrorists who announce their presence and seek credibility through killing. Training for counterterrorism—whose effectiveness, the authors show, depends on incorporating red teams; that is, the groups that play the part of active aggressors. In *Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training*, the authors show how simulation-driven counterterrorist training, take readers through the prerequisites for and basic principles of conducting a successful simulation and preparing responders to face threats—whether from sophisticated terrorist organizations. The authors clearly explain how to create an effective red team whose members can operate from within the terrorists' mindset. An innovative chapter by the authors demonstrates how to use dramatic techniques to teach red teams believable role-playing. Rounding out this book, a case study of the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood illustrates the cost of failures and the still-current need for serious attention to potential threats. First responders—whether civilian or military—will find *Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training* indispensable as they address and detect threats.

future.

Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since September 11, few issues have been more hotly debated than the United States' role in the world. In this hard-nosed but sophisticated examination, America is the indispensable guardian of world order. Gray's constructive critique of recent trends in national security is holistic, rooting defense issues and prospective answers both in U.S. national history and in the emerging international security environment. Colin S. Gray is professor of international politics and strategic studies at the University of Reading, England, and senior fellow at the Center for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. He is the author of seventeen books, including *Modern Strategy* and *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*.

In *Legitimate Target, A Criteria Based Approach to Targeted Killing*, Amos Guiora proposes that targeted killing decisions must reflect consideration of four distinct elements: law, policy, morality, and justice, ensuring that it complies with principles of domestic and international laws.

"This study focuses on military competitiveness in the age of transparency, and asserts that the U.S. military must consciously prepare itself to fight in an information transparent world created by the explosion in the quantity and quality of information and products available to the general public user, the ready accessibility to the information, and the affordability in acquiring any desired data in a transparent world at an alarming rate. In the future, anyone can affordably keep tabs on the actions of everyone else. Hence, the U.S. military must consciously begin to investigate ways to maintain its advantage in a rapidly evolving, and increasingly transparent world. It must minimize the impact transparency has on how we will fight wars and conduct contingency actions. We must not be caught by surprise. Military competitiveness will require multifaceted solutions ... This study investigates how the U.S. can retain its military advantage in the coming age of transparency. The inevitable economic pressure of information e-commerce, is advancing the rate of global transparency...

[Empire, Culture and Trade, 1905-2005](#)

[Great Powers, Small Wars](#)

[Population Diversity and the U.S. Army](#)

[Asymmetric Conflict since 1945](#)

[Great Power Strategy in Asia](#)

[Can America be Defeated?](#)

[Five-dimensional \(cyber\) Warfighting](#)

[Managing American Hegemony](#)

[Technology and Terrorism](#)

[New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces](#)

[Organizing for National Security](#)

This book measures the current institutional and political realities surrounding globalization against philosophical ideals. Though the contributors share no particular orthodoxy, they do share the conviction that human responsibility is possible in circumstances that often appear to deny human agency.

Case studies examine the economics, domestic politics, and international factors that ultimately shaped military events more than military capacity and strategy.

The author takes issue with the complacent belief that a happy mixture of deterrence, arms control and luck will enable humanity to cope adequately with weapons of mass destruction, arguing that the risks are ever more serious.

This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy".

[Fundamental Challenges](#)

[Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Assymmetrically](#)

[Asymmetric Warfare](#)

[The End of Secrecy](#)

[The Second Nuclear Age](#)

[Can the Army After Next be Defeated Through Complex Concepts and Technologies?](#)

[Weapon of Mass Destruction](#)

[New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking](#)

[Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation](#)

[Grand Strategy in the War Against Terrorism](#)

[Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically](#)